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THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

"What you farmers need to do is raise less corn and
more Hell!
We want the abolition of the National Banks, and we
want the power to make loans direct from the Government. We want the accursed foreclosure system wiped
out. We will stand by our homes and stay by our firesides by force if necessary, and we will not pay out debts
to the loan-shark companies until the Government pays
* B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1966, University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Mannino is the
author of LENDER LIABILTY AND BANKING LITIGATION (Law Journal Seminars Press 1989). Portions of this paper are based upon material contained in Chapters 4 and 6 of that book.
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its debts to us."'

W HEN Mary Elizabeth Lease spoke these words one hundred
years ago at the First Meeting of the Populist Party, she
drew upon an already long history of American antipathy toward
bankers. 2 Fueled by medieval prohibitions against usury, class
conflict and fears of international conspiracies, Americans have
often lashed out against bankers, particularly in times of economic depression. The classic confrontation between President
Andrew Jackson and Philadelphia banker Nicholas Biddle over
the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States provides
the paradigm. In vetoing the recharter, Jackson characterized the
Bank's promoters as a "monied aristocracy" which sought "the
advancement of the few at the expense of the many," and he emphasized the number of foreigners holding the Bank's stock as a
3
danger to American economic independence.
In this century, the need for close governmental regulation
of banking became and remains a popular theme, and fear of international banking conspiracies has surfaced often, usually laced
with virulent doses of antisemitism. 4 Anti-banker sentiment has
also made its way into popular culture. Woody Guthrie defended
the notorious bank robber Pretty Boy Floyd in his folk song of the
same name by observing, "Some rob you with a six-gun, some
with a fountain pen." 5 More recently, Mick Jagger has sung of
"gray-suited graftsters. ' '6

The American public has savored the fall of bankers from
grace from early in our history. Three prominent Pennsylvania
bankers are famous examples. Robert Morris, after whom a leading banking trade association was named because of his activities
1. Mary Elizabeth Lease, Speech at the First Meeting of the Populist Party,
1890, Topeka, Kansas, quoted in J.D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT 160 (1931).
2. Like many others who have attacked banks, Ms. Lease was a lawyer, one
of the first women members of the Kansas Bar. Known for her "golden voice,"
she was the child of Irish political exiles. Born in Pennsylvania, she moved to
Kansas in the 1870s, taught Catholic school, unsuccessfully tried farming, and
became a noted speaker for Irish nationalism, women's suffrage and unions. See

J.M.

BURNS, THE WORKSHOP OF DEMOCRACY

185-86 (1985).

3. G.G. VAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA, 1828-1848, at 66-67 (1959).
With increased foreign investment in American banks and with 25% of all domestic business loans now being extended by foreign banks, we may expect to
hear more of the latter in the years to come.
4. Father Charles Coughlin's depression era Social Justice Movement is one
notable example. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 16-28
(1960).
5. Woody Guthrie, Pretty Boy Floyd.
6. Mick Jagger, Salt of the Earth on Beggar's Banquet side 2, band 5 (1968).
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as a financier of the American Revolution and founder of the first
commercial bank in America, ended his career in debtor's
prison.7 Even more dramatically, nearly a century apart, both
Nicholas Biddle 8 and Andrew Mellon 9 were indicted at the end of
their careers-Biddle for criminal conspiracy and Mellon for income tax evasion. Recent criminal indictments arising out of sav0
ings and loan and commercial bank failures continue this trend.'
If, as Justice Holmes believed, "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic," IIthis tradition is one explanation for why banks
are so often defendants in civil RICO suits. Indeed, RICO's continuity with this bank-bashing tradition of American history and
culture was apparent in the first notable civil RICO suit against a
bank, which was filed by a Georgia lawyer-borrower named Jackie
Kleiner.12 Kleiner threatened to file similar actions, challenging
banks' calculations of their prime rates, on a "bank-of-the-monthclub" basis, 13 and characterized the financial institution community as "banksters.' 14 His populist assault upon banks was reinforced when the Supreme Court rejected attempts to limit
RICO's reach to organized crime, instead holding that:
Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises .... The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from
its consequences. The fact that § 196 4(c) is used against
respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of
7. E. Richardson, The Athens of America, 1800-1825, inPHILADELPHIA: A 300YEAR HISTORY 221 (R. Weigley ed. 1982).
8. After Jackson's veto, the Second Bank of the United States was rechartered as the United States Bank of Pennsylvania. After that bank suffered a series of financial reversals, Biddle was indicted for criminal conspiracy, but
acquitted. See VAN DEUSEN, supra note 3 at 85.
9. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 569-70 (1959).
10. See Justice Launches New Attack on S & L Fraud in 'Acute' Areas, 1 BANK

BAILOuT LITIGATION NEWS 3 (December 20, 1989), reporting on a Department
of Justice initiative to prosecute criminal fraud affecting financial institutions.
The article notes that a special task force in Dallas, Texas, has brought criminal
charges against 57 defendants, convicting 46, including bank chairmen, presidents and vice presidents, with only two acquittals. Restitution awards exceeding $10 million were also imposed in these cases. Id.
11. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
12. Kleiner followed in the populist tradition of another Georgia lawyer,
Tom Watson. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, TOM WATSON: AGRARIAN REBEL
(2d ed. 1973).
13. See Mannino, Prime Rate Overcharge Cases: How to Exorcise the RICO Devil,
101 BANKING L.J. 196 (1984); Harrigan, Lawyer Turns War Against Prime Rate into
Cottage Industry, Wall St. J., July 7, 1981, § 1,at 15, col. 2.
14. Adams,Jackie Kleiner: Lawyer, Teacher, and the Bane of the 'Banksters', THE
AM. BANKER, June 9, 1983, at 1.
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specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being
misconstrued. ' 5
II.

THE APPLICATION OF

RICO

TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Financial institutions have been sued in a wide variety of civil
actions under RICO. 16 Typically, the plaintiffs have been either
commercial borrowers' 7 or investors in failed enterprises which
have been financed by the lender.' 8 These typical cases are by no
means exhaustive, however. Other cases have been brought by
plaintiffs as varied as home purchasers claiming knowledge of environmental hazards by a mortgage lender,' 9 subcontractors on
housing projects financed by a lender, 20 beneficiaries of trusts for
which a bank acted as corporate trustee, 2' discharged employees,2 2 and a patentholder claiming misappropriation of confiden23
tial information.
III.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)

Most civil RICO suits against financial institutions have been
filed under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity ......

There are three key technical elements in a section 1962(c)
action of particular interest to financial institution defendants,
since their proper construction will often lead to the dismissal of
15. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
16. See generally E.F. MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY AND BANKING

LITIGATION

§ 4.02 (1989) [hereinafter MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY].

17. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606

(1985).
18. See, e.g., Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36

(3d Cir. 1987).
19. See, e.g., Albanese v. City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 710 F. Supp. 563

(D.N.J. 1989).
20. See, e.g., Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.
1989).
21. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Continental I11.Nat'l Bank, 790 F.2d 638 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986).
22. See, e.g., Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988).
23. See Cox, Florida Firm Hits State Street with RICO Suit, THE AM. BANKER,
November 30, 1989, at 3.
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such defendants on initial motions directed to the sufficiency of
the complaint or on motions for summary judgment. 24 These are
(1) the separate person and enterprise requirement, 25 (2) the conduct requirement, and (3) the pattern requirement. The appropriate interpretation of each of these elements in a section
1962(c) case against a financial institution is discussed separately
below.
A.

The Person-EnterpriseRequirement

As the Supreme Court has noted, "[T]he major purpose of
[RICO] is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime." 26 For this reason, section 1962(c) speaks of two
entities-an "enterprise" which represents the infiltrated entity,
and a "person" which embodies the infiltrator. Virtually every
court which has considered the issue has concluded that section
1962(c) requires two separate entities to satisfy these discrete
roles, and that the same entity cannot serve simultaneously as
both person and enterprise.2 7 In addition, most courts have held
that the enterprise cannot be liable for damages for a violation of
section 1962(c) since the statute sculpts it as a victim of racketeering activity. As the Third Circuit explained in B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co.:

2

8

One of the Congressional purposes in enacting RICO
was to prevent the takeover of legitimate businesses by
criminals and corrupt organizations....

It is in keeping

with that Congressional scheme to orient section 1962(c)
toward punishing the infiltrating criminals rather than
the legitimate corporation which might be an innocent
victim of the racketeering activity in some
24. For a discussion of other elements of § 1962 and § 1964, such as proxiLENDER LIABILrrv,
supra note 16, § 4.03 [5].
25. The discussion of this element below is limited to actions brought
under § 1962(c), since several courts have interpreted other subsections of
§ 1962 not to impose such a requirement of separate entities. See, e.g., PetroTech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (3d Cir. 1987).
26. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981).
27. See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132, 13940 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, No. 86-5135 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 1990)
(1990 WL 126317); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29-30 (1st
Cir. 1986); Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628,
634 (3d Cir. 1984); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984). See

mate cause, standing, and compensable injury, see MANNINO,

generally MANNINO,

LENDER LIABILITY,

supra note 16, § 4.03 [2][a].

28. 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984).
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circumstances.29
Requiring separate entities to serve as person and enterprise,
and holding only the person liable for damages, has created
problems for RICO plaintiffs suing banks, particularly where
these plaintiffs are borrowers. 30 In such cases, the bank itself is
the only entity dealing with the plaintiff, and a second entity must
be found to serve as the enterprise. Three approaches to this
problem have emerged, with mixed results.
1. Affiliated Corporations
An early approach to solving the second entity problem was
to name the bank as the person conducting the affairs of its bank
holding company parent, which served as the enterprise. This approach was approved by the Seventh Circuit in Haroco Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co.,S' an early borrower case. There,
the court concluded that it was "virtually self-evident that a subsidiary acts on behalf of, and thus conducts the affairs of, its parent corporation." 3 2 As with many self-evident propositions,
however, this conclusion merely begs the question, and is analytically incorrect where there is no substantive interaction of the two
33
entities.
Section 1962(c) contemplates an interaction of entities, with
the responsible person influencing the entity by conducting its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. As such, the mere
fortuitous presence of a parent-subsidiary relationship, without
more, should not be sufficient to impose liability upon a bank for
a violation of section 1962(c) without a substantive showing of
such actual conduct, with the affairs of one entity being influenced by the other.3 4
29. Id. at 633-34 (citations omitted); see also Bennett, 770 F.2d at 315
("[Riequiring a distinction between the enterprise and the person comports with
legislative intent and policy. Such a distinction focuses the section on the culpable party and recognizes that the enterprise itself is often a passive instrument or
victim of the racketeering activity.").
30. In cases where investors in a failed enterprise financed by the bank are
the plaintiffs, however, no such technical problem arises, since the failed entity
can serve as the enterprise, and the financing bank as the person.
31. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'don othergrounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
32. Id. at 402-03. Contra NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 936-37
(4th Cir. 1987).
33. See MANNINO,. LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 4.03 [2][b].
34. For a discussion of the type and quantum of activity needed to satisfy
the conduct requirement, see infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text. See also
NCNB Nat'I Bank, supra note 32.
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A more analytically sound resolution of this issue was
reached by the Fifth Circuit after Haroco. In Atkinson v. Anadarko
Bank and Trust Co. ,3 the court rejected an attempt by borrower
plaintiffs to separate a bank person from an association in fact
enterprise composed of the bank, its holding company parent and
three employees. In upholding the setting aside of a multimillion
dollar jury verdict, the appeals court reasoned:

The record here contains no evidence that the bank, its
holding company, and the three employees were associated in any manner apart from the activities of the bank.
Plaintiffs wholly failed to establish the existence of any
entity separate and apart from the bank. In this case, the

alleged racketeering activity forming the predicate of the
RICO charge was mail fraud-the mailing of false statements requesting payment of interest in excess of the

agreed amount. The mailing of loan statements was an
activity of the bank. There is no evidence of any other
activity on the part of the alleged enterprise. 3 6
Even though there was some action by the holding company in
Anadarko, since it purchased shares of plaintiffs' notes from the
bank, this was found insufficient since the banking activity in
question in the suit was that of the bank alone, and the holding
company had no separate relevant activity.
A similar approach was followed in United States Auto Finance
Co. v. Union FederalSavings & Loan,3 7 a case brought by defrauded

investors in a used car business financed by a bank. Plaintiffs
claimed that the enterprise consisted of the bank, two of its employees and the third party who devised the fraudulent scheme.
In dismissing a section 1962(c) count against the bank, the district
court concluded that "[e]ven if Union Federal, through its board
of directors or through its employee ...

actively participated in

the scheme to defraud plaintiffs, it cannot be held liable under
section 1962(c), because the scheme was accomplished only by
using Union Federal's banking services, and Union Federal can8
not be both a person and the RICO enterprise."
35. 808 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032 (1987).
36. Id. at 441; accord NCNB Natl Bank, 814 F.2d at 936.
37. No. L89-400039 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file).
38. Id. at 10; see also Marriott Bros. v. Gage, 704 F. Supp. 731, 741-42 (N.D.
Tex. 1988), reconsideration denied, 717 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Tex. 1989). In United
States Auto Finance Co., subject to satisfying the conduct requirement, plaintiffs
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The line of demarcation between person and enterprise
drawn by these cases requires more than separate formal entities
to impose section 1962(c) liability upon a bank. The factor which
must be added to the separate entities for liability under section
1962(c) is substantively relevant activity by both entities, with an
interaction between the two. An example may be helpful on this
arcane, but important, point. Assume a bank holding corporation
causes a newly acquired bank subsidiary to call all loans through
mailed notices declaring defaults contrary to the terms of the
written loan documentation where the borrowers are farmers, on
the basis that farm loans are poor risks. Here, a person (the holding company) causes an enterprise (the newly acquired bank) to
conduct its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity (mail
fraud), with the person dictating a policy which is then implemented by the enterprise. Imposing liability upon the bank holding company in such circumstances comports fully with the RICO
infiltration model and is thus appropriate under section
1962(c). 3 9
2.

Vicarious Liability

A second approach to the separate entities problem is to
name the bank officers on the affected loan or workout as the persons conducting the affairs of the bank enterprise, and then to
hold the bank in turn civilly responsible for the actions of those
officers under theories of agency or respondeat superior. While
this approach received some early support at the district court
level, 40 it has correctly been rejected by every federal appeals
court which has considered the issue. 4 ' The simple and most direct answer to why theories of vicarious liability are inappropriate
could have designated the used car business as the enterprise, with the bank as
the person conducting its affairs to defraud plaintiffs. For a discussion of the
conduct requirement, see infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
39. Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1989),
provides another example of lender liability consistent with the policies underlying § 1962(c). For a discussion of Atlas Pile Driving Co., see infra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165, 179-82
(D. Conn. 1987); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985).
41. See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132, 140 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), rev'd on othergrounds, No. 86-5135 (D.C. Cir. Sept, 4, 1990) (1990 WL
126317) (en banc); D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964, 967-68 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2833 (1988); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824
F.2d 1349, 1359-60 (3d Cir. 1987); Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230
(8th Cir. 1987); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir.
1986).
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is supplied by the statute itself, which requires two distinct entities, and declares "unlawful" only the actions of the person who
conducts the affairs of a separate enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. As one court noted:
It makes little sense to require that the "enterprise" and
the "person" be distinct, but then to impute liability
from the "person" to the "enterprise" as a matter of
course when the "enterprise" employs the "person."
Such a result is simply inconsistent with the framework
42
of the statute and the intent of Congress.
Given the unanimity of appellate authority concerning the unavailability of vicarious liability under section 1962(c), it is unlikely that this theory will be pursued in the future. 43
3.

Associations in Fact

A third approach to the separate entities problem is to sue
the bank as a person conducting the affairs of an association in
fact enterprise composed of the bank and bank officers or any
available third parties. This approach has met with mixed results,
with bank defendants raising two principal objections to the
approach.
The first objection is based upon the statutory definition of
an enterprise, which provides that an enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not

a legal entity." 44 Defendants have argued that this definition limits an association in fact enterprise to entities composed solely of
individuals. While this argument has a statutory basis, it has
proved generally unpersuasive on two grounds. First, most
courts stress that the definitional section is only "illustrative, not
exhaustive," given its use of the word "includes." 45 Second, the
42. Continental Data Sys. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 440 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
43. Since most of the cases on this point have treated the enterprise as a
victim, they do not conclusively bar the availability of vicarious liability where
the enterprise participates in, profits from, or authorizes the person's acts. Even
in such cases, however, the statutory language bars imposing vicarious liability
on the person. See MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 4.03 [21[c].

44. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) (1988) (emphasis added).
45. Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995 n.7 (8th Cir.
1989); see also Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (3d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 655-56 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1164 (1989); United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 353 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988).
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liberal construction clause of RICO 4 6 has been invoked to resolve
this point in favor of the plaintiffs on policy grounds. 4 7 As one
court observed, "[W]e think it unwise policy to permit individuals to escape the reach of RICO through the simple artifice of
48

incorporating."
Banks have proved more successful in their second argument
against use of association in fact enterprises which include the
bank as a member. This argument is based upon the requirement
that an enterprise must be a "continuing unit" with an "ascertainable structure distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity." 49
As we saw in our prior discussion of the Anadarko Bank and United
States Auto Finance Co. cases, this requirement has resulted in dismissals of RICO cases for failure to demonstrate an ongoing enterprise separate and apart from the bank itself.50 As such, where
the substantive conduct at issue is that of the bank alone, attempting to sue the bank under section 1962(c) as a person conducting
an association in fact enterprise including itself is likely to fail.
By contrast, Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co.,51
which upheld a RICO treble damage jury verdict against a mortgage lender, shows the proper use of an association in fact enterprise which includes a bank. There, a mortgage lender and its
46. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970) (providing that RICO
"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes").
47. For cases deciding in favor of plaintiffs on policy grounds, see supra
note 45.
48. Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 995 n.7.
49. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, 704 F. Supp. 731, 742 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (rejecting an association in fact enterprise including two banks), reconsideration denied, 717 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Tex. 1989); accord Montesano v. Seafirst
Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1987) (association in fact of secured lender and repossessing agent not an enterprise for lack of continuity);
Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1032 (1987); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401; H.G. Gallimore, Inc. v. Abdula, 652
F. Supp. 437, 445 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (association in fact of bank and its employees
not an enterprise for lack of structure); Nelson v. National Republic Bank,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91, 481 (N.D. Ill. 1984);
see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); Yellow Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Local Union 639,883 F.2d 132, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Allowing plaintiffs
to generate such 'contrived partnerships' consisting of an umbrella organization
and its subsidiary parts, would render the non-identity requirement of section
1962(c) meaningless. We decline to permit such an 'end run' around the statutory requirements."), rev'don othergrounds, No. 86-5135 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 1990)
(1990 WL 126317) (en banc).
50. For a discussion of the "enterprise" element in Anadarko Bank and
United States Auto Finance Co., see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
51. 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1989). For a similar application of the association in fact enterprise approach, see Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 727 F. Supp.
759, 772 (D.P.R. 1989).
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affiliated real estate development corporation were sued as persons conducting the affairs of an association in fact enterprise
composed of themselves and other affiliated entities involved in
the construction and sale of two residential housing projects.
Subcontractors on those projects sued the mortgage lender for
participating in a fraudulent scheme to defraud the subcontractors of payment for their materials and labor. 52 While the court
did not adequately explain its reasoning in treating this association in fact as a proper enterprise, the result reached is sound,
because the enterprise had a functioning existence separate and
apart from the mortgage lender and its activities. For the scheme
to work, each of the separate entities which composed the association in fact had to perform an assigned part. Thus, the mortgage
lender provided funds for developing the property; the real estate
development firm hired subcontractors and falsely promised
them payment, and, at the same time it paid an affiliated subcontractor who performed carpentry work and was also a member of
the association in fact enterprise.
B.

The Conduct Requirement

Section 1962(c) declares it unlawful for a person "to conduct
or to participate, directly or indirectly in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."
"Conduct" is not defined in the RICO statute, and the level of
activity it requires is by no means clear from the relatively sparse
civil RICO case law on point, which has divided into two general
camps. The first approach requires that the person have some
managerial participation in the enterprise, while the second requires only a nexus between the pattern of racketeering activity
53
and the affairs of the enterprise.
The issue arises in civil RICO cases against banks in two principal contexts. In borrower or other cases where the bank deals
directly with the plaintiff, the conduct requirement will typically
pose little problem to plaintiffs, for the bank's own affairs will be
at issue. 54 By contrast, in the second major category of cases involving banks as section 1962(c) defendants-those involving in52. "The methodology employed was consistent in that DiCon loaned
funds to an undercapitalized insider borrower, DiCon foreclosed when the borrower failed to pay, the subcontractors' liens were subordinate to DiCon's mortgage, and Conry, DiCon and LMH thus gained the value of the subcontractors'
work without remunerating them." Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 994.
53. See generally MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 4.03 [4].

54. In such cases, as we have seen, a more difficult obstacle will be satisfy-
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vestors in a failed enterprise financed by the bank-the conduct

requirement, on its face, raises an attractive defense for lenders,
since lenders do not in any popular sense of the term "conduct"
55
the affairs of their borrowers.
1. The Management Approach
Following the common meaning of the term, the Eighth Circuit en banc in Bennett v. Berg,56 held that "[a] defendant's participation must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise,
which ordinarily will require some participation in the operation
or management of the enterprise itself." 5 7 This same managerial
approach was urged by defendants and amici upon the Supreme
Court in American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 58 but
the Court declined to reach the conduct issue, holding that it had
not been raised properly. 59
Since Haroco, a number of other courts have adopted the
managerial approach, or some variant, focusing upon the positions held by the RICO person defendant, and the policy-shaping
ing the separate entities requirement. For a discussion of the separate entities
requirement, see supra notes 26-52 and accompanying text.
55. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 274 (1987) tells us that
"conduct," in a business context, means "to direct or take part in the operation
or management of ... a business." It further explains that conduct "implies
taking responsibility for the acts and achievements of a group."
56. 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dened, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
57. Id. at 1364.
58. 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
59. Id. at 608. The amicus brief of the American Bankers Association
argued:
If liability is to be predicated upon the interrelationship of the bank and
bank holding company, a RICO plaintiff must be able to allege some
meaningful domination or control by one of those entities (the "person") over the affairs of the other (the "enterprise") in such a way as to
cause the other to commit illegal activity as a matter of corporate policy
dictated by the defendant. A mere relationship or association, without
more, is a neutral fact under RICO, which requires the active "conduct" by the "person" of the affairs of the "enterprise".
Brief of the American Bankers Association as Amicus Curie at 18, American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc. 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (No. 84-822).
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powers inherent therein. 6° In Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v. Lee, 6 1 which
followed a managerial approach, several bank defendants were
dismissed from a section 1962(c) action, inter alia, because there
was no clear showing that they "conducted or participated in the
direction or management of the companies' affairs," even though
the plaintiff alleged that it was induced, pursuant to a scheme in
which the banks participated, to purchase stock in two companies
at an inflated price to enable the companies to repay a substantial
62
indebtedness to the banks.
2.

The Nexus Approach

A second line of cases adopts a more liberal standard, under
which a defendant is considered to conduct the affairs of a RICO
enterprise if it performs acts "necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise.- 63 In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v. Touche Ross & Co., 64 this standard was utilized to
hold that outside auditors conducted the affairs of their clients
65
within the meaning of section 1962(c).
Courts following the nexus approach emphasize the broad
remedial purposes underlying RICO, and the language of section
1962(c), which uses the words "participate, directly or indirectly"
as well as the word "conduct" in describing the prohibited action.6 6 Following this standard, one district court has held, on a
60. See, e.g., Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., No. 85-2794 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19,
1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 1016, 1018 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987);
Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 494, 497 (N.D. I1. 1985)
(defendant was able to commit predicate offenses by virtue of his position as
president and single shareholder of enterprise); see also Rodriguez v. Banco
Cent., 727 F.Supp. 759, 773 (D.P.R. 1989) (citations omitted) (Section 1962(c)'s
conduct standard "requirefs] some nexus between the financier's actions and
the predicate acts causing plaintiffs' injuries. ....
A financier acting in the normal
course of business cannot be held liable for the developer's misdeeds."). See
generally MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 4.03 [4] [b] [i.
61. 625 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 803 F.2d 322
(7th Cir. 1986).
62. 625 F. Supp. at 1100. On these facts, a better case could have been
made for aiding and abetting or conspiracy liability for the banks. See MANNINO,
LENDER LIABILrry, supra note 16, §§ 7.01-7.02. For the use of an aiding and
abetting theory against banks under § 1962(c), see Rodriguez, 727 F. Supp. at
773-74.
63. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782
F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367
(5th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16 (1983)).
64. 782 F.2d 966 (11 th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 970.
66. See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132, 14144 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, No. 86-5135 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 1990)
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motion to dismiss, that a bank could be considered to have indirectly participated in the conduct of the affairs of a limited partnership it financed by participating in a loan to the partnership,
67
and taking the investor plaintiffs' notes as security for that loan.

The nexus approach to the conduct issue is unsound for two
reasons. As a matter of statutory interpretation, it elevates the
modifying words "participate" and "indirectly" to a prominence
which overshadows the principal statutory word-"conduct"which section 1962(c) uses twice, once as a verb identifying the
prohibited action, and the second time as a noun describing the
prohibited action. "Conduct" means directing or taking part in
the operation or management of a business, 6 and provides the
standard by which courts should be guided in interpreting section
1962(c).
There is a second, equally important, reason for courts to
adopt the managerial approach to the conduct issue. That reason
is to construe RICO in harmony with the many other statutory
provisions and common law theories under which lenders have
been held liable for controlling the affairs of borrowers. 69 Under
each of those theories, ranging from statutory liabilities for payment of withholding taxes and for federal securities and environmental law violations, to common law liability under the
instrumentality and equitable subordination doctrines, courts
have focused on whether lenders have intruded into the day-today operations of a borrower's business. Relevant factors that
courts consider in determining whether to impose such control
liabilities include whether the lender engaged in any of the following activities:
1) Determining which creditors should be paid, or
which checks to honor;
2) Collecting funds owed to the borrower directly from

third parties, and paying the borrower's bills;
3) Vetoing specific transactions, including business expansion plans and hiring proposals;
(1990 WL 126317) (en banc); see also MANNINO,
§ 4.03 [4] [b] [ii].

LENDER LIABILITY,

supra note 16,

67. Cairns v. Renneisen, Renneisen & Redfield, No. 85-2827 (E.D. Pa. Dec.

23, 1985). By contrast, the court in Rodriguez indicated that while such facts
might support an aiding and abetting theory under § 1962(c), "[a] financier act-

ing in the normal course of business cannot be held liable for the developer's
misdeeds." Rodriguez, 727 F. Supp. at 773.

68. For a definition of "conduct," see supra note 55.
69. See generally MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 16, §§ 6.01-.06.
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4) Terminating top management or a majority of employees, or drastically cutting salaries;
5) Developing detailed long-term business plans, or
sales, credit, and inventory policies for the
borrower;
6) Selecting specific directors or management consultants for the borrower;
7) Voting pledged stock;
8) Requiring prior approval of day-to-day business
decisions;
9) Assuming control over, or possession of, a borrower's property or business records; and
70
10) Holding undated resignations.
Courts faced with deciding whether to impose section 1962
(c) liability upon a bank for "conducting" the affairs of a borrower
should utilize the managerial test as the controlling standard, and
use these benchmarks to evolve a consistent and statutorily sound
approach.
C.

The Pattern Requirement

1. The Evolving Case Law
In the early years of civil RICO litigation, little attention was
paid by litigants or the courts to RICO's requirement that plaintiffs prove that the defendant conducted the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Instead, most
courts assumed that the pattern requirement was satisfied if the
defendant committed two or more predicate acts within the ten
year period specified in the statute. 7' In a provocative footnote in
its majority opinion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 72 the Supreme
Court questioned such an interpretation in dictum, and ended the
opinion by chiding both the lower courts and Congress for failing
"to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' -73 The Court
suggested that RICO was not aimed at sporadic or isolated acts,
and implied that the pattern requirement was satisfied only where
70. This list is taken from

MANNINO,

LENDER LIABILITY,

supra note 16,

§ 6.07[1], at 6-36.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988), defining "pattern," inter alia, as "requiring
at least two acts of racketeering activity." For early interpretations of this requirement, see MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 4.03[3][a], at 4-24.
72. 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).

73. Id. at 500.
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the predicate acts possessed "continuity plus relationship." 7 4
The lower federal courts paid close attention to the Supreme
Court's challenge in Sedima to develop a "meaningful" definition
of pattern. Over the course of the next four years, literally hundreds of opinions addressed the issue, culminating in whatJustice
Scalia of the Supreme Court characterized as "the widest and
most persistent circuit split on an issue of federal law in recent
memory."' 75 Three general approaches emerged, along with minor variations of each. At one extreme, some courts viewed the
pattern requirement as mandating proof only of two related predicate acts. Courts at the other extreme required proof of separate
criminal episodes. A third group took a more nuanced approach,
examining such factors as the number of participants and people
affected, the duration or time span of the alleged predicate acts,
the number and type of acts, the number and separateness of episodes, the number of purposes underlying the acts, and the threat
76
of continuing criminal activity.
In H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 77 the Supreme
Court reexamined the pattern requirement in light of this split in
circuits. With four justices inviting constitutional challenges to
the statute, the Supreme Court rejected both extreme approaches, and declined to adopt the third.
The plaintiffs in H.J. were telephone customers who alleged
that the telephone company had engaged in a pattern of corrupt
behavior, including making cash payments and supplying gratuities to state utility commissioners, to obtain approval of excessive
rates over a six year period. While the Court agreed that this was
sufficient pleading of a pattern of racketeering activity, it gave
only broad benchmarks as guides for construing that requirement
in the future.
Emphasizing repeatedly that RICO was a "broad" and "flexible" statute, and rejecting a "narrow" or "pinched" construction
tied to an "organized-crime-type perpetrator," the majority reaffirmed its Sedima dictum that the twin keys to defining the pattern
requirement were the concepts of "continuity" and "relation74. Id. at 496 n.14.
75. HJ., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2906-07
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. The three approaches, and the cases discussing them, ate discussed at
length in MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 4.03[3][b], at 4-25 to 4-

30.
77. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
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ship." 78 As in Sedima, the majority opinion characterized the relationship component as requiring "criminal acts that have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 79
On the more difficult issue of what the continuity component
required, the majority chose to paint in broad strokes, announcing that continuity is "centrally a temporal concept" and that
"long-term criminal conduct" was the evil at which RICO was directed.8 0 The majority thus concluded that "[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future
criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement." 8 '
On the question of how to determine whether particular
predicate acts raised the threat of "future criminal conduct," the
majority concluded that such a determination "depends on the
specific facts of each case," but noted that one way to prove such
a threat was by demonstrating that "the predicate acts or offenses
82
are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business."
2.

Application of the H.J. Pattern Analysis to Section 1962(c) Actions
Against FinancialInstitutions

While broad and nonspecific, the H.J. approach to the pattern requirement should prove helpful in damming the flood of
section 1962(c) actions against financial institutions. Once again,
as with the person-enterprise and conduct requirements, the impact will vary depending upon whether the plaintiff is a borrower
or a third party. These two general types of litigation are analyzed separately below.
a.

Borrower Litigation

Litigation brought by borrowers will most easily satisfy the
pattern requirement after H.J. where it is predicated upon some
regular practice of the bank in its dealings with borrowers. As
such, cases challenging the manner in which a bank computes its
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2900.
Id. at 2901 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982)).
Id. at 2902.
Id.
Id.
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interest rates83 or credits funds deposited 4 will be the easiest
cases for borrower plaintiffs on this point. In the absence of an
attack upon a general practice of the bank, however, it will become more difficult for borrowers to prove a pattern under sec-

tion 1962(c), particularly where borrower-specific behavior by
loan officers on a particular credit is involved.
Some such cases will be dismissed on the pleadings. For example, making threats over a period of days that particular borrowers will be jailed for non-payment of their loans does not
constitute a pattern, in the absence of evidence that this is a regular practice of the lender.8 5 Where, by contrast, behavior over a
period of months is involved, courts will need to sort through the
allegations more closely. Where the activity involved has ended
before the suit is brought, plaintiffs' burden will often be difficult.
Thus, where borrowers claimed that a lender breached a commitment to provide interim financing for a housing development and
devised a scheme to take over the development for its own benefit, a court applying the H.J. standard granted summary judgment
for the lender, concluding that "one year's worth of predicate
acts" which concluded before suit was commenced did not establish "a sufficient threat of continuity." 8 6 While such a ruling may
have stretched H.J. beyond its intended limits, it demonstrates
that even behavior extending almost a year may not be sufficient
to constitute a pattern, where it is not done as part of a lender's
regular practice, and affects only a single borrower on a particular
loan.
Cases involving multiple predicate acts over a few months
may also be dismissed on summary judgment where no regular
practice of the lender is implicated. For example, fraudulent
83. The widespread "prime rate" litigation of the 1980s provides an excel-

lent example. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473
U.S. 606 (1985). See generally Mannino, The Lessons of the Prime Rate Cases, 1
LENDER LIABILirY NEWS, Part 2, 13 (January 11, 1989); Mannino, supra note 13,
at 191.
84. See, e.g., Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333
(7th Cir. 1989).
85. Edwards v. First Nat'l Bank, 872 F.2d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1989) (threats
to three borrowers on two consecutive days that they "would all go to jail" insufficient to establish a pattern pre-H.J.); see also Graue Mill Dev. Corp. v. Colonial
Bank & Trust Co., No. 88 C 2584 (N.D. 11. Jan. 4, 1990) (1990 WL 6823) at *8
n.2 (alleged misrepresentations to one borrower would not constitute pattern
since only "one victim and one scheme" involved).
86. Myers v. First City Bank, No. 86-3393 (E.D. La. July 21, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) at *10. There, the court also found a post-suit letter
from the lender indicating that it had liquidated some collateral insufficient to
establish a threat of continuity.
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pledging of assets, fraudulent subordination of a lien and seizure
of the fraudulently pledged assets were found insufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity under the H.J. standard
because they involved "only at most a three month period of
87
time, a single victim and a single injury."
While H.J. will thus give lenders considerable comfort in
cases not involving regular practices of the bank where the conduct in question lasted less than one year and is completed before
any suit is commenced, it will not be of much assistance at the
pleadings stage in the case of a troubled loan which extends over
a period of years and the bank's continuing actions during that
extended period are challenged. Thus, one pre-H.J case found
the pattern element satisfied in a case claiming that a coal broker's contracts to supply two utilities were seized by its lender for
breach of a workout agreement, and that the lender converted the
broker's funds to its account. There, the court found sufficient
allegation of a pattern in multiple alleged acts of wire and mail
fraud over a period of four years, with four victims, and a number
of perpetrators.88
b. Third Party Litigation
Third parties, particularly investors in failed enterprises financed by a bank, will often have a difficult time satisfying the
pattern requirement after H.J. It will ordinarily be impossible,
consistent with ethical and legal responsibilities, 9 to allege that a
lender conducted its borrower's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, since absent the exercise of sufficient control
over the affairs of the borrower of a type consistent with the level
required by statutory and common law theories of control liability, 90 a lender's usual activities will be limited to making and mon87. Adnan Int'l Mktg., Inc. v. Hamilton Bank, No. 87-5604 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); see also Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. Int'l Bank,
726 F. Supp. 1377, 1381-85 (D.D.C. 1989) (summary judgment granted dismissing RICO claims based on churning an account for three months for lack of
pattern).
88. Blue Line Coal Co. v. Equibank, No. 87-6150 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
89. Courts have begun to impose sanctions for violations of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure for RICO allegations made without a reasonable basis. See, e.g.,
Farguson v. Bank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rule
11); Spiegel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650-51 (7th Cir.) (Rule
38), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986).
90. For a discussion of statutory and common law theories of control liability, see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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itoring a particular loan. Even where such activities extend over a
prolonged period of years, they are likely to be isolated and sporadic, and typically will be difficult to link, in any meaningful
sense of proximate causation, to the harm suffered by an investor
plaintiff.9' As such, investor plaintiffs will have considerable difficulty pleading and proving the type of "long-term criminal conduct" required by H.J., either as a matter of regular ways of doing
business by a lender, or relevant long-term activity linked to the
plaintiff's injury.
Other third party plaintiffs may more easily be able to
squeeze a lender's activities within the H.J. pattern framework.
Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon FinancialCo.9 2 again supplies a helpful example. In that case, although the lender's activities were
limited to the financing of only two housing projects, the court
found this sufficient to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity
harming the defrauded subcontractor plaintiffs because the
lender's acts of mail fraud, in mailing foreclosure notices which
resulted in barring the subcontractors' liens, extended over a period of three years, harmed a number of different subcontractors,
affected two different projects and "involved a complex series of
activities indicating continuity, such as the numerous corporate
entities created ... and the working and financing arrangements
93
employed."
IV.

CONCLUSION

As historically unpopular entities, financial institutions have

been disproportionately named as RICO defendants in civil actions commenced under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

Such suits are,

however, peculiarly vulnerable to a number of technical challenges by such defendants. In most borrower suits, plaintiffs will
be unable to plead or prove an ongoing enterprise separate and
distinct from the bank itself. In third party suits, the conduct requirement, properly construed to require some managerial control over a business financed by the lender, will usually prove an
91. But see Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d
Cir.), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978). See generally MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY,
supra note 16, § 7.02.
92. 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Atlas Pile Driving Co.,
see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
93. Id. at 994-95. A similar close relationship among the developers and
their financiers led to a finding of pattern and a potential aiding and abetting
claim against the financiers in Rodriguez v. Banco Central. See 727 F. Supp. 759,
772-75 (D.P.R. 1989).
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insurmountable hurdle. Finally, the pattern requirement after
H.J. will cut down further on suits against lenders by both borrowers and third parties where no regular practice of the bank is
challenged. In combination, these three points should go far toward diminishing that portion of a financial institution's legal
94
budget devoted to defending RICO lawsuits.
94. Other defenses not discussed in this article, including lack of proximate
cause between the activities of the lender and the harm suffered by the plaintiff;
release, waiver and estoppel; and absence of scienter should also be explored by
financial institution defendants in civil RICO suits. See, e.g., Mannino, supra note
13, at 211-12 (release, waiver and estoppel); MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY, supra
note 16, § 4.03[5][b] (proximate cause); § 4.04[4] (release, waiver and estoppel);
§ 4.07[4] at 4-58 to 4-59 (scienter in mail fraud cases).
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